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1. The Importance of State Capacity
Recent years have witnessed a renewed recogni-
tion both of the importance of agricultural 
development to growth and poverty reduction 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and of the important role 
that the state has to play in stimulating market 
development in rural areas (Poulton et al. 2006; 
World Bank 2007). However, there is an “agricul-
tural development paradox” during the early 
stages of rural development in that “the need 
for pro-poor state services is high when state 
failure is profound” (Kydd 2009, p453).
This raises important questions: what are the 
key dimensions of state capacity for agricultural 
development and how can they be measured? 
These questions are of interest to development 
organisations seeking to design and to monitor 
the impact of “capacity building” interventions. 
Increasingly, researchers are also likely to be 
interested in comparing (changes in) state 
capacity across countries. This raises the ques-
tion of whether the rather intangible concept 
of capacity can be compared in this way. 
This brief presents some reflections on this 
question. It investigates the concept of state 
capacity for agricultural development in Africa 
(section 2), then considers both direct (section 
3) and indirect (section 4) approaches for 
measuring state capacity for agricultural devel-
opment across countries.
2. Defining State Capacity for 
Agricultural Development
van de Walle 2001 argues that most states in 
Africa are “neo-patrimonial” in nature. In other 
words, they are hybrid between a rational-legal 
component on the one hand and a patronage 
political system on the other. The rational-legal 
component is exemplified by public policy 
objectives aligned with the Millennium 
Development Goals, formal policy-making 
processes designed to realise these and a subset 
of civil servants who embody the ideals of 
Weberian bureaucracy. By contrast, the 
patronage political system begins from elites 
asking the question, “What do we need to do 
to obtain/retain power?” Their answers to this 
question may look very different from the 
pursuit of stated public policy objectives 
because power is maintained, in important 
measure, through “the giving and granting of 
favors, in an endless series of dyadic exchanges 
that go from the village level to the highest 
reaches of the central state” (van de Walle 2001, 
p51)1. Of course, van de Walle’s analysis is not 
without its critics (see, for example, de Grassi 
2008). However, it does emphasise the funda-
mental point that state capacity to promote 
agricultural development is not just a question 
of the resources that are at the state’s disposal, 
but also of the incentives that state agents have 
to work hard in pursuit of stated public policy 
objectives, such as smallholder agricultural 
development2.
Dimensions of State Capacity 
van de Walle 2001 (p130) defines state capacity 
as the capacity of a government “to design, 
implement, monitor, and evaluate policy”. (We 
might add: policy “in pursuit of stated public 
objectives”). Whilst apparently simple, even this 
definition quickly raises several questions that 
anyone wishing to compare capacity across 
states first has to answer. 
Are we chiefly interested in capacity for 
decision-making or policy implementa-
tion?3 The former requires strong analytical 
capacity (as much about skills as about numbers 
of personnel?), information from evaluation of 
previous interventions and processes for incor-
porating these into decision-making. By 
contrast, the latter is more demanding of 
manpower (albeit with lower average levels of 
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formal qualifi cations) and requires management 
skills plus information from monitoring. Given 
personnel and fi nancial constraints, there could 
be trade-off s between capacity for designing 
policies and for implementing them. On the 
other hand, these two types of capacity could 
be strongly correlated if they are infl uenced in 
the same way by common external factors, for 
example overarching performance incentives 
emanating from the wider political economy. 
Whether separate measures are necessary there-
fore remains an open question. In what follows, 
we will simply talk about state capacity as a 
whole, keeping in mind that it might have to be 
investigated at diff erent levels empirically.
Should capacity for policy implementation 
be assessed in absolute terms or in relation 
to policy choices? Some policy decisions 
require little implementation capacity to be 
eff ectively put into practice (for example, the 
decision to deregulate a sector), while others 
require much more (for example, the decision 
to set up a new extension system). The corre-
spondence between the degree of ambition of 
the decisions taken and the capacity of the state 
to implement them is thus important (Fukuyama 
2004). Local conditions and historic path depen-
dency may also influence the state capacity 
required to achieve given objectives (see Box 
1). However, insofar as ambitious policies are 
Tschirley et al. 2009 observe that all African cotton industries face the common challenge of 
providing high quality pre-harvest services and input credit to smallholder producers, whilst at the 
same time ensuring that these producers are paid an attractive price for the resulting seed cotton 
output. Post-liberalisation, a range of market structures has emerged at ginning level across Africa’s 
cotton industries. Diff erent structures present diff ering challenges for industry regulation, which in 
turn demand diff ering regulatory capacities, even though the ultimate objectives of regulation are 
the same.
Thus, where numerous ginners compete to procure seed cotton at harvest time (competitive 
sectors), producers tend to receive attractive prices for their seed cotton. However, ginners may 
have little incentive to provide extension advice or inputs on credit to producers and quality control 
can be poor. A regulatory agency that seeks to correct these “market failures” may require signifi cant 
fi eld presence for service delivery and/or quality monitoring. By contrast, in a sector dominated by 
two or three ginners (concentrated sector), problems of free-riding on pre-harvest service provision 
may be managed through informal inter-company coordination, thus creating conditions for 
contract farming arrangements to develop. However, lack of competitive pressure may be refl ected 
in low seed cotton prices. Such sectors, therefore, need a central regulator (with appropriate 
political backing) that can maintain suffi  cient barriers to entry to preserve the basic concentrated 
structure, whilst at the same time ensuring that incumbent fi rms do not use their privileged position 
to depress seed cotton prices. Finally, in sectors organised into separate concession zones (local 
monopoly sectors), ginners should have adequate “security” to invest in pre-harvest service 
provision. However, whether or not they are incentivised to do so may depend on the terms of their 
concession agreement (How long is it for? On what conditions will it be renewed? Is the re-alloca-
tion process likely to be transparent and fair?). This suggests that the regulatory agency will need 
some monitoring capacity – to objectively assess the performance of the various concessionaires 
– plus the procedures to manage the zonal allocation process in a way that inspires investor 
confi dence.
Source: Poulton et al. 2010
Box 1: Regulating African Cotton Industries
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seen as necessary to lift the constraints imposed 
on agricultural production by markets failures, 
a focus on the absolute capacity of the state to 
implement any policy might be appropriate. 
When looking at capacity for agricultural 
policy-making, how broadly or narrowly do 
we define agricultural sector institutions? 
Foster et al. 2001 argue that one of the distinc-
tive features of the agricultural sector is the 
multiplicity of players involved – not just private 
sector, NGO and state, but also the multiplicity 
of state agencies. Agricultural performance is 
influenced not just by sectoral policy (as well as 
crop-specific policies, which are sometimes 
developed and implemented by parastatal 
bodies) but also by macro-economic and trade 
policy, and all the policies targeting the develop-
ment of the rural sector, including infrastructural 
and environmental policy. Even when narrowly 
conceived, agricultural policy may be largely the 
remit of one ministry in one country, whilst 
similar responsibilities are divided across a 
number of ministries (agriculture, livestock, irri-
gation etc) in another.4 When comparing 
capacity across countries, it is important to 
ensure that one is comparing like with like.
Are we interested only in capacity at the 
central government level or also at capacity 
at the regional or local level? Another distinc-
tive feature of the agricultural sector is its need 
for investment and policy implementation 
tailored to local agro-ecological conditions 
(Foster et al. 2001). Decentralisation has 
proceeded unevenly across Africa. In some 
countries, much of the capacity for agricultural 
policy implementation now rests within local 
government administrations. Polidano 2000 
points out that data on staff and resourcing at 
local level can be even harder to obtain than 
data from central government. However, if (for 
example) extension remains a central govern-
ment responsibility in some countries, but 
extension staff are employees of local govern-
ment in other countries, it is once again impor-
tant to ensure that one is comparing like with 
like. 
3. Direct Measures of State Capacity
State capacity is a function of both resources 
and incentives. Various indicators of both can 
be conceived and Figure 1 provides examples 
of some of these (chosen on both conceptual 
and practical grounds). Such indicators can be 
examined individually, then a subjective assess-
ment made of what they imply for overall state 
capacity. Alternatively, if a single measure of 
capacity is desired, it is suggested that composite 
measures of resources and incentives are 
derived separately, then multiplied. This reflects 
the observation that neither resources without 
performance incentives nor incentives without 
resources will stimulate much in the way of agri-
cultural development. 
We identify two major categories of resources 
that the state requires: personnel (human 
capital), and finance. (We discuss information 
below). 
Resources
Staff are arguably the most important asset of 
any organisation. For agricultural policy making, 
analytical skills are vital. Thus, an indicator of 
capacity might be the number of staff with a 
PhD (or possibly a Masters)5. For service delivery, 
however, staff numbers and coverage are impor-
tant. Thus, an indicator of capacity might be the 
size of the staff within agricultural ministries 
(and possibly also in associated parastatal 
organisations) relative to the agricultural labour 
force or sectoral GDP. However, we recognise 
that greater human resources do not increase 
state capacity if they result from over-staffing 
due to politically motivated job creation or if 
staff do not have sufficient operating expendi-
ture to enable them to function effectively.
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The most obvious indicator of financial 
resources is the size of the combined budget of 
the relevant agricultural ministries and associ-
ated agencies (per head of agricultural labour 
force or as a percentage of agricultural GDP). A 
limitation here is that recurrent budgets in Africa 
are typically weighted heavily towards salaries. 
This suggests that a focus on budgets net of 
salaries might be more appropriate. Alternatively, 
the salary share of budgets could be taken into 
consideration in a separate indicator. 
Fiscal capacity features prominently in the 
general literature on state capacity as a state’s 
capacity to raise funds and sustain its budget 
are fundamental to all its other indicators. 
However, commonly used indicators, such as 
the share of the state’s income arising from 
income/trade/total tax are poorly connected to 
the capacity of the state to promote agricultural 
development. On the other hand, the share of 
the agricultural budget (recurrent and develop-
ment) funded by donors may serve as a useful 
(inverse) indicator of the true capacity of the 
state to sustain support for agricultural develop-
ment, as well as possibly being correlated with 
strength of ownership over, and commitment 
towards, official agricultural development 
strategies.
It can be debated whether or not information 
should rank alongside personnel and fi nance 
as a fundamental category of resources that the 
state requires. Timely and reliable information 
is undoubtedly critical for effective decision 
making and management of policy implemen-
tation, and it is likely that the cost of such infor-
mation varies across countries (inversely related 
to population density, for example?). On the 
other hand, where the performance incentives 
facing the state are strong enough, personnel 
and fi nance can and will be devoted to the gath-
ering of such information. We, therefore, discuss 
information as an endogenous variable in 
section 4.
Incentives
Whether resources translate into capacity 
depends critically on performance incentives. 
Thus, van de Walle 2001 claims that, while “the 
individual educational level of manpower avail-
able to states in Africa increased dramatically 
in the fi rst three decades of independence … 
there is much evidence that the capacity of 
African governments … actually declined 
between the early independence era and the 
1990s” (page 130). He attributes this fi rst and 
foremost to the politicization of African civil 
Figure 1: Indicators of State Capacity for Agricultural Development
Personnel per head of agricultural labour 
force
Number of staff  with PhDs
Agricultural budget (US$ per head of 
agricultural labour force or % of agricultural 
GDP)
Salary share of agricultural budget
Share of agricultural budget funded by 
donors (-ve)
Average wage (for frontline extension worker 
and/or senior technical offi  cer), US$ p.m.
Number of agricultural sector ministries (-ve)
Divergence between budgeted and actual 
expenditure of Ministry of Agriculture
Share of budget allocated to agriculture (%)
Ethnicity or political affi  liation of Minister of 
Agriculture (relative to President)
  Resources         Incentives
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services (instead of recruitment and promotion 
on merit), which in time contributed to corrup-
tion, low morale and absenteeism. Similarly, 
increasing budget size, even net of salaries, may 
reflect populist/electoral pressures to invest in 
redistributive programs rather than a real 
growth in state capacity or commitment to 
public goods provision (Joughin and Kjaer 
2010). In the case of Malawi, Chinsinga and 
Cabral 2010 argue that increased resource flows 
in recent years (associated primarily with the 
implementation of the successful fertilizer 
subsidy programme) have not led to increased 
capacity on the part of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Food Security. Rather, preoccupation with 
the subsidy programme has reduced the minis-
try’s ability to undertake other tasks.
An important aspect of an organisation’s 
capacity is its ability to learn from experience 
and, especially, from mistakes. Agricultural 
policy should continuously learn from, and be 
refined in the light of, experience from existing 
implementation efforts. However, whilst infor-
mation and some analytical capacity are needed 
for this, it will only happen if there exist 1) strong 
political incentives forcing agricultural minis-
tries to deliver high performance and 2) internal 
organisational culture and processes that 
encourage learning (Korten 1980).
For the purpose of deriving indicators, we 
divide incentives into three main categories: 
wage incentives for individual effort and morale, 
the incentives to act in accordance with public 
policy objectives provided by organisational 
processes (institutional arrangements), and the 
overarching incentives for organisational perfor-
mance that are provided by the wider political 
economy setting. 
Low wages are commonly linked to low 
morale and performance, as well as to the temp-
tation to corruption. Depending on whether the 
focus is on capacity for policy making or imple-
mentation (or both), the preferred indicator 
might be the average wage of senior technical 
staff6 or of front line extension workers. By 
contrast, at the highest echelons, basic salaries 
are less likely to reflect total incomes and thus 
incentives. We do note, however, that wages are 
not the only determinant of staff morale. Thus, 
Future Agricultures Consortium 2009 report the 
effect on the morale of extension workers in 
Kenya of rigid and centralised procedures for 
promotions that take little account of actual 
effort or performance. In a similar vein, Grindle 
1997 highlights the importance of managerial 
control over hiring and promotion as a correlate 
of strong performance by public sector 
agencies.
Indicators that seek to measure the quality 
(including transparency) of key procedures 
within state agencies - for example budgeting 
and decision making - fit well with the Weberian 
ideal of bureaucracy and with the way in which 
the rational-legal component of the state is 
supposed to operate. (By contrast, patrimonial 
systems are highly personalised and subject to 
considerable individual discretion). This is the 
approach of a number of indicators within the 
World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment database, although the scores are 
not specific to agencies within the agricultural 
sector. Arguably, scores for corruption or red 
tape affecting trade or transport/infrastructure 
policies do not need to be collected at the agri-
cultural level, as overall public sector perfor-
mance in these areas will also impact state 
capacity for agriculture. However, if one is 
seeking indicators of the strength of formal 
procedures within the agricultural sector, one 
suggestion would be the discrepancy between 
budgeted and actual state expenditure on agri-
culture (averaged over a few years).
In terms of the political setting, one possible 
indicator of the incentives faced by policy-
makers is the number of ministries dealing with 
agricultural-related issues (a higher score signi-
fying lower performance incentives). In a neo-
patrimonial state, a large number of ministries 
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may well (as in Kenya) refl ect a perceived need 
to accommodate a range of ethnic or political 
interests within the governing coalition, but the 
correlate of this is that ministries are not allo-
cated on the basis of performance. In practical 
terms, a larger number of ministries also creates 
greater problems of coordination in both policy 
making and implementation. Meanwhile, to 
measure the political importance attached to 
agriculture, one could look at the budget share 
devoted to this sector and/or to the political or 
ethnic origin of the minister for agriculture rela-
tive to that of the head of state. The political or 
ethnic origin of agricultural policy-makers could 
also be compared with the geography of 
diff erent crops production, if capacity was to be 
investigated at the crop level, although this 
relationship is debated (Kasara 2007; Bates and 
Block 2009).
4. Indirect Approaches to Measuring 
State Capacity
Because capacity is diffi  cult to measure directly 
(if only because it is the product of both 
resources and incentives, which are themselves 
diffi  cult to quantify) one might also consider 
indirect measures of state capacity, such as 
outcomes and determinants (Kjaer et al. 2002).
While they are not specifi cally related to agri-
culture, a number of outcome indicators are 
available in existing databases to account for 
the legal capacity of a state: property rights 
protection indicators, ratios of private credit to 
GDP, indicators of the ease of access to credit or 
of the quality of business regulation. In the same 
vein, the evolution of fiscal deficits or the 
discrepancy between voted budgets and actual 
spending (in percentage terms) are often used 
in the literature. 
In terms of policy-making outcomes at the 
agricultural level, particular emphasis should be 
placed on observed investment in agricultural 
public goods. Investment in public goods, such 
as agricultural research and extension, rural 
roads and irrigation is widely perceived as the 
most effi  cient way of generating broad-based 
benefi ts for agricultural producers (Paarlberg 
2005; Rausser and Roland 2009)7. However, such 
investments are not an effective patronage 
instrument, as benefi ts are medium to long run 
(hence not in line with electoral cycles) and 
widely spread instead of focused on a small 
number of infl uential recipients. Investment in 
public goods is thus likely to be strongest in 
countries where the state displays a strong 
rational-legal component (a strong bureaucracy 
for example) and in ‘benevolent’ dictatorships 
where the political horizon is more long term. 
As per our earlier discussion, gathering of 
information for decision making and manage-
ment of policy implementation is an important 
intermediate8 outcome of state capacity. 
Identifying appropriate indicators for informa-
tion gathering is not easy, however, especially 
in states with high levels of donor investment. 
Management information systems may exist, 
but decision makers may not demand informa-
tion from them. Frequency of nationally repre-
sentative agricultural household surveys is one 
possible indicator, although not entirely 
immune from this critique. 
When outcomes are used as proxies for state 
capacities, it is diffi  cult to (i) clearly ascribe them 
to state capacity and (ii) measure ‘pure capacity’ 
or ‘policy-free capacity’, in the sense of a capacity 
to implement any type of policy, beyond norma-
tive appreciation. Whilst a clear theoretical 
framework can assist with the former, in the 
latter case what is likely to be observed is a mix 
of policy choice and pure capacity. The evolution 
of fi scal defi cits or the discrepancy between 
voted budgets and actual spending, for example, 
refl ect both the choice to reduce a defi cit or to 
stick to budget allocation and the ability of the 
government/administration to eff ectively do so. 
On the other hand, recognising the importance 
of learning and adaptability as dimensions of 
capacity, high budget discrepancy or worsening 
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deficits could be a sign of high capacity in the 
context of a changing external environment. 
While overcoming such shortcomings is likely 
to be difficult, outside of a detailed case study 
perspective, this issue should be kept in mind 
when interpreting outcome proxies for state 
capacity. 
Alternatively, state capacity can be viewed 
as a channel through which a number of political 
economy variables influence policy-making by 
impacting incentives. In this perspective, it could 
be approached as an endogenous variable and 
appreciated on the basis of measures of its 
potential determinants. Among such enabling 
conditions are ethnic fragmentation and the 
strength of civil society, measures of which are 
available for most African countries. They are 
believed to impact state capacity by influencing 
the “autonomy” that states enjoy from interest 
group pressure, although the link between 
autonomy and state capacity remains subject 
to much debate (a.o. Migdal, 1988; Evan, 1995, 
Weiss, 1998; van de Walle, 2001). It is also 
suggested that political stability or conflicts 
should be considered, as it is possible that in 
the face of strong instability, incentives will be 
distorted towards recovering political stability. 
Finally, the economic situation of a country is 
considered to play a role in state capacity 
through both the nature of economic 
production (the underlying assumption being 
that sources of rents such as oil resources could 
reduce the incentives to build efficient institu-
tions and means of tax raising); the impact of 
budgetary cuts that might arise at times of 
economic downturns; the indirect effects of 
inflation on incentives (notably through the 
losses in civil servant’s purchasing power and 
the resulting incentives to seek alternative 
means of earning their living); and external 
dependency, notably on aid. 
5. Concluding Remarks: The Way 
Forward
The key argument of this note is that incentives 
are as important to state capacity as resources 
are. This makes the measurement of state 
capacity a complex challenge. We find strong 
theoretical and empirical support for investi-
gating state capacity at the sectoral level. 
However, for agriculture this cannot be done 
using only pre-existing indicators and data-
bases. Rather, it will require the collection of new 
data. The need for multiple indicators means 
that data collection and processing will be rela-
tively costly. Moreover, the question of weighting 
will also have to be addressed if multiple indica-
tors are to be summarized in a single measure, 
thereby allowing countries to be ranked in a 
comp
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End Notes
1 If power were instead obtained through the 
exchange of policies for votes, as in a “pure” 
democratic model, the discrepancy between 
stated public policy objectives and the 
exigencies of maintaining power – which is 
present in all political systems – would 
arguably be smaller. 
2 At times, van de Walle himself seems to 
consider incentives as an inherent part of state 
capacity. At other times, he distinguishes the 
two, as, for example, when he describes policy 
outcomes as “interactions between the 
clientelistic needs of neopatrimonial states, 
the extremely low capacity of these state 
structures [emphasis added], and the 
dominant economic ideas among policy elites 
in the 1960s and 1970s” (page 16).
3 A related question concerns the capacity of 
the executive (which is often seen as the key 
player in decision-making) as opposed to that 
of the bureaucracy/administration/public 
sector (which is likely to be the key player in 
policy implementation). However, interaction 
between the two levels is important for both 
policy making and implementation. Thus, 
senior bureaucrats play an important role in 
policy formulation (Polidano 2000) whilst the 
capacity of the executive to monitor the 
bureaucracy and obtain results from it (i.e. 
generate performance incentives) is important 
for eff ective implementation.
4 Future Agricultures Consortium 2009 explain 
how the number of “rural development” 
ministries in Kenya has ballooned to nine 
during President Kibaki’s period of offi  ce, in a 
bid to accommodate more partners in the 
governing coalition. The same responsibilities 
are handled by two or three ministries in 
Malawi.
5 Where policy analysis is concerned, there may 
be some economies of scale. Thus, country A 
with an agricultural population twice as large 
as country B may not need twice as many 
people to analyse agricultural policy 
eff ectively. 
6 We have in mind here the top grades that are 
not political appointments and, therefore, 
subject to regular change. According to 
Polidano 2000, the durability of these posts 
means that they can exert considerable 
infl uence over policy development.
7 One could also look at the frequency at which 
household surveys are carried out as a proxy 
for information gathering and decision-
making state capacity. If we look beyond 
agricultural policy, investments in education 
and health could also be added to this list.
8 It is both endogenously determined and, in 
turn, a determinant of state capacity for 
agricultural development.
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